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ORGANIZATIONS' LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF
VOLUNTEERS
JEFFREY D. KAHNt
Volunteers are vital to our society. Diverse in their activities, vol-
unteers donate their time and energy to such fields as social service, the
arts, parks and recreation, health care, justice, religion, education, agri-
culture, and politics. Volunteers have always been an integral part of
our society,' but in recent years volunteering has become the subject of
increasing public and political attention. As communities face the chal-
lenge of providing services and enhancing the quality of life in a time of
reduced government spending, volunteers serve as an important
resource.
2
The growing influence of volunteerism' raises a variety of impor-
tant legal issues.4 This Comment will focus on the vicarious liability of
organizations for injuries caused by their volunteers. According to the
limited number of courts that have addressed this issue, organizations
are liable for the torts of their volunteers to the same extent that they
are liable for the torts of their salaried employees.' Although this posi-
tion is particularly burdensome to organizations that do not have close
control over their volunteers,' the imposition of liability is justified be-
cause the tort system can properly encourage organizations to develop
better volunteer management practices. Undermining this encourage-
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1 See generally S. ELs & K. NoYEs, BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF AMERI-
CANS AS VOLUNTEERS (1978).
2 See, e.g., Karn, Volunteerism and the Budget Cuts, VOLUNTEER VA., Fall
1981, at 1; Schindler-Rainman, Trends and Changesin the Volunteer World, in VOL-
UNTARISM ANDSOCIALWORK PRACTICE, A GROWING COLLABORATION, at xxx (F.
Schwartz ed. 1984).
3 The word "volunteerism' has been coined to refer to the body of work per-
formed by all types of volunteers in all settings. See S. ELLIS & K. NOYES, supra note
1, at 11. Writers on volunteerism now recognize the existence of basic traits shared by
all volunteer programs and a generic set of management tools that have proven to be
successful in managing these programs. See id. at 264-67.
4 See YOUNGER LAWYERS SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA, LEGAL
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF VOLUNTEERS AND VOLUNTEER AGENCIES (n.d.);
Kahn, Legal Issues in Volunteerism: Preliminary Survey Results, J. VOLUNTEER AD.,
Winter 1984-1985, at 31, 36.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 29-63.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 64-70.
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ment, however, is the insurance industry's practice of categorizing as
high-risk those organizations that utilize volunteers. This policy ignores
the differences among organizations in their level of control over volun-
teers, prevents the law from reaching its full potential in encouraging
effective volunteer management, and erects a barrier against maximum
volunteer participation.7 The Comment concludes by proposing a
scheme that will help insurers more accurately assess the risks of volun-
teer participation and will assist organizations in developing the degree
of control over their volunteers that the law presumes to exist.'
I. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
For purposes of this Comment, "volunteer" will be used to refer to
someone who, of her own free will, "choose[s] to act in recognition of a
need, with an attitude of social responsibility and without concern for
monetary profit, going beyond what is necessary for one's physical
well-being."' The number of Americans who participate in volunteer
activities is staggering. An estimated fifty-five percent of all American
adults engage in volunteer activity.10 The value of time donated by vol-
unteers in one year was estimated at approximately $64.5 billion."
7 See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
* S. ELLIS & K. NOYES, supra note 1, at 10. This definition departs from some
legal uses of the term "volunteer." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413-14 (5th ed.
1979) (describing a volunteer as one giving services without promise of remuneration or
one intruding into matters that do not concern her); Christenson, The Legal Definition
of a "Volunteer," VOLUNTARY ACTION LEADERSHIP, Fall 1982, at 17-18 (distin-
guishing between a "pure volunteer"-one who assists in work in which she has no
interest and from which she expects no reward-and a "gratuitous employee"-one
who serves on an ongoing basis without pay). "Volunteer" is also the legal label often
given to a person who assists in a medical emergency. See Mapel & Weigel, Good
Samaritan Laws-Who Needs Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protec-
tion in the United States, 21 S. TEx. L.J. 327, 330-43 (1980); Comment, Good Sa-
maritan Laws-The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303,
304-05, 308-10 (1983).
10 The 1983 Gallup Survey on Volunteering, reprinted in Allen, Volunteering in
America: A Status Report, VOLUNTARY ACTION LEADERSHIP, Winter 1984, at 16, 20.
1 See Dollar Value of Volunteer Time, VOLUNTARY ACTION LEADERSHIP,
Spring 1982, at 33, 33 (dollar value of contributed time for the year 1980, based on
calculations done by the Independent Sector, a national consortium of corporations and
nonprofit organizations concerned with volunteering and philanthropy).
This calculation, based on the average salary level of persons in the salaried
workforce of the same age, sex, and education level as the average volunteer, may seri-
ously underestimate the total value of volunteer time. See Karn, Money Talks: A Guide
to Establishing the True Dollar Value of Volunteer Time (pt. 2), J. VOLUNTEER AD.,
Spring 1983, at 1, 2-7 (explaining that volunteer production is often underestimated
because the number of volunteer hours is miscalculated); Karn, Addendum to "Money
Talks," J. VOLUNTEER AD., Fall 1984, at 12, 12 (noting that volunteers do not receive
the fringe benefits given to salaried workers and that most estimates of the dollar value
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Although volunteers work in the public sector, the for-profit sec-
tor, and the nonprofit sector, this Comment will focus on the nonprofit
sector, in which the majority of volunteers are located. 12 In addition,
this Comment will examine only the vicarious liability of organizations
that can be sued as separate legal entities for the torts of their volun-
teers. 8 Even with these qualifications, the analysis still covers tens of
millions of Americans who volunteer and may be creating liability
every day for the organizations for which they work.
The enormous size of the volunteer workforce indicates its huge
contribution to society. The activities of volunteers benefit our commu-
nities, the organizations for which they work, and the volunteers them-
selves. Of course, a principal benefit of volunteers is economic. Volun-
teers allow an organization to do more with a limited budget than it
could do if it had to pay all of its workers. The presence of volunteers
also enhances an organization's ability to raise funds."
Volunteering furthers and enhances the functioning of our demo-
cratic system and the values on which that system is based. Democracy
of volunteer time are therefore too low).
12 See GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., AMERICANS VOLUNTEER 1981, at 3-5
(June 1981). The number of volunteers who work in the for-profit sector is rather
small and includes mainly volunteers in for-profit hospitals and other health care facili-
ties, student interns, and lawyers, accountants, and other professionals working as part-
time pro bono publico consultants with small and minority-owned businesses. See id.
The volunteer workforce in the public sector is very large and includes all of the
volunteers in schools, courts, and local governments. See id. at 3-5. However, the issue
of vicarious liability of units of government for torts committed by volunteers is consid-
erably complicated by the issue of governmental immunity, which is beyond the scope
of this Comment. See Greenhill, Recent Developments in Governmental and Charita-
ble Immunities, 21 FED. INS. COUNS. 123, 125-29 (1981).
S According to a 1981 Gallup survey, five percent of American adult volunteers
and six percent of American teenage volunteers work only informally or alone. See
GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 12, at 5. Even though these volunteers do
not work for a particular formal organization, they are still volunteers and may have
individuals as masters for purposes of vicarious liability. See, e.g., Heims v. Hanke, 5
Wis. 2d 465, 468, 93 N.W.2d 455, 458 (1958) (holding an uncle liable as master for
nephew's tortious act committed while nephew was voluntarily helping wash uncle's
car), overruled on other grounds, Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d
281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).
This Comment also will not examine the liability of members of unincorporated
associations for the torts of their nonmember agents. The imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity in this context presents a unique set of problems. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3n 1165
(1975).
14 A perpetual problem in the nonprofit sector is a shortage of funds. Organiza-
tions have been more successful raising funds when volunteers, rather than employees,
are used to solicit money. See Letter from Susan Ellis, President of Energize Associates
(consulting firm specializing in volunteerism) to Michele Silverman (Apr. 15, 1985) [on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review]. Furthermore, volunteer time
may be included in an organization's contributions to matching grants, thereby increas-
ing the amount to be contributed by the outside funding source. See id.
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is strengthened by the voluntary participation of citizens in all aspects
of their communities. Through volunteering, citizens can effect change
in society, gain a sense of control over their environments, and work
together to improve their own lives.15
Volunteering "also makes a significant contribution to the volun-
teer's own psychological health and self-actualization." ' Volunteers
themselves benefit from the services they donate by developing new
skills, meeting new people, and having fun."' Writers on volunteerism
now recognize that the best volunteer activities benefit the givers of the
service as much as the recipients.1
These benefits make the encouragement of volunteerism an essen-
tial policy goal. Nevertheless, a recent survey of directors of volunteers
indicates that organizations' fears of incurring liability and concerns
about high insurance rates may restrict the types of assignments that
volunteers are given.19 Recent developments in the law relating to non-
profit organizations have heightened these concerns.
II. LIABILITY OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
A. The End of Charitable Immunity
Until recently, most organizations that utilized volunteers were
immune from all tort liability under the doctrine of charitable immu-
nity.20 This form of immunity typically applied to organizations "cre-
is See E. SCHINDLER-RAINMAN & R. LIPPrrT, THE VOLUNTEER COMMUNITY:
CREATIVE USE OF HUMAN RESOURCES 15-19 (2d ed. 1977).
16 Id. at 15.
11 See K. ALLEN, S. McCuRLEY & D. MOSEL, WILL VOLUNTEERING SURVIVE?
6-12 (1981).
18 See, e.g., Allen, Volunteering in America in 1984: A Status Report, VOLUN-
TARY ACTION LEADERSHIP, Winter 1984, at 16, 17 ("We now recognize that volun-
teering is a mutually beneficial act, helping the helper as well as the consumer.").
19 See Kahn, supra note 4, at 33-36. The directors of volunteers from a variety of
program settings indicated that legal issues substantially influenced program planning.
See id. at 33. Of the respondents who said they had consulted with someone regarding
a legal matter, the vast majority had sought information on liability or insurance. See
id. at 34-35. In addition, when asked what legal issues relating to volunteerism they
would like more information about, the overwhelming majority of respondents men-
tioned liability. See id. at 36.
Further evidence of the importance of liability issues comes from the various state
government agencies charged with promoting volunteerism within the states. Many of
these agencies have felt the need to publish material about liabilities for the use of
agencies in their states. See, e.g., MINNESOTA OFFICE OF VOLUNTEER SERVICES, DE-
PARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR VOLUNTEERS (1984);
Virginia Division of Volunteerism, Legal Liability in Volunteer Programs (n.d.) [man-
uscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
"0 See Annot., 25 A.L.R.4TH 517, 523-24 (1983). One of the few remaining states
with charitable immunity is Arkansas. See J.W. Resort Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank,
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ated and maintained exclusively as . . . charit[ies]." 2 Today there is a
clear trend toward the abolition of such immunity and toward holding
charitable organizations liable for the torts of their servants.22
According to one commentator, the most prevalent rationale for the
abolition of charitable immunity has been that charitable organizations
have control over the activities of their employees and agents and there-
fore are able to take precautions against injuries caused by them.2" As
will be explored below, such control often does not exist over the acts of
volunteers. 24 Among the other arguments for abrogating charitable im-
munity are the increased solvency of many charitable organizations,
25
the desire to provide an incentive for safe operations,2" and the in-
creased availability of affordable liability insurance.27 In abolishing
charitable immunity, however, courts and legislatures did not foresee
the insurance industry's resistance to insuring organizations for the
torts of their volunteers.2
As a consequence of the abolition of charitable immunity, tort vic-
tims are no longer forced to bear the cost of injuries caused by charita-
ble organizations and their workers. Instead, the organizations them-
selves have been deemed responsible for, and capable of, absorbing this
cost, and courts apply traditional tort doctrines to assess liability.
3 Ark. App. 290, 292, 625 S.W.2d 557, 558 (1981).
11 J.W. Resort Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 3 Ark. App. 290, 292, 625 S.W.2d
557, 558 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
22 See Annot., supra note 20, at 547-51; see also Note, Charitable Immunity--An
Anomaly of Tort Liability, 4 N.C. CENT. L.J. 133 (1972) (discussing the doctrine of
charitable immunity as an exception to general principles of tort liability).
Charitable immunity has generally been eliminated through judicial action, see,
e.g., Sullivan v. First Presbyterian Church, 260 Iowa 1373, 1380, 152 N.W.2d 628,
633 (1967); Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Assoc. for Child Dev., 12 Ohio St. 3d
210, 214, 466 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1984); Nolan v. Tifereth Israel Synagogue, 425 Pa.
106, 109, 227 A.2d 675, 675-76 (1967), but on at least one occasion has been elimi-
nated through legislative action, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
21 See Greenhill, supra note 12, at 135. This writer goes on to say that vicarious
liability of charitable organizations "is of questionable application when the action is
based on the negligence of pure volunteers-people who are not employees, and over
whom the charity really has no control or right of control." Id.
14 See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
25 See Comment, Patient Recovery-A Poor Prognosis for Hospitals? The Ex-
panding Scope of Hospital Liability, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 519, 524 (1983).
2 See id.
2 See, e.g., President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); see also Keeton, The Impact on Insurance of Trends in Tort Law, in 1
ISSUES IN INSURANCE 70 (J. Long ed. 1981) (arguing that charitable organizations can
prevent devastating tort judgments by procuring liability insurance at reasonable pre-
mium charges).
2" See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
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B. Respondeat Superior
When faced with a suit against an organization for an alleged in-
jury caused by a volunteer, courts in jurisdictions without charitable
immunity have applied the traditional doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.29 There are currently only about a dozen reported cases address-
ing this issue,"0 but the demise of charitable immunity and the increas-
ing significance of volunteerism are sure to make these suits more
common. Respondeat superior dictates that the master is liable for torts
committed by the servant,31 regardless of the fault of the master.32 In
,order for respondeat superior to be imposed, three requirements must
be met: (1) there must be an injury caused by the negligence or will of
the servant; (2) there must be a master-servant relationship; and (3) the
servant must have been acting within the scope of her employment.33
In order to make a discussion of the three requirements more con-
crete, this Comment will track the imposition of respondeat superior in
one of the pioneering cases involving the liability of an organization for
the torts of its volunteer, Baxter v. Morningside, Inc." In this case the
volunteer performed errands for the charitable organization. The injury
21 See Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz. App. 571, 499 P.2d 185
(1972) (volunteer caused accident on way to organization meeting); Sokolow v. City of
Hope, 41 Cal. 2d 668, 262 P.2d 841 (1953) (volunteer for hospital auxiliary caused
injury at fundraising fair); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 231 P.2d 241 (1951)
(volunteer divinity student caused auto accident); Leno v. YMCA, 17 Cal. App. 3d
651, 95 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1971) (volunteer scuba instructor's negligent supervision led to
student drowning); Vind v. Asamblea Apostolica de la Fe en Christo Jesus, 148 Cal.
App. 2d 597, 307 P.2d 85 (1957) (volunteer minister in auto accident on way to meet-
ing); Trinity Lutheran Church v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (vol-
unteer driving to deliver holiday gifts injured motorcycle driver); Garcia v. Herald
Tribune Fresh Air Fund, 51 A.D.2d 897, 380 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1976) (child staying with
volunteer host family drowned in pool); Davis v. Shelton, 33 A.D.2d 707, 304
N.Y.S.2d 722 (1969) (local boy scout council held not liable for scoutmaster's alleged
failure to supervise properly a boy scout who fell out of tree), appeal dismissed, 26
N.Y.2d 829, 257 N.E.2d 902, 309 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1970); Ricker v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
8 A.D.2d 565, 183 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1959) (scoutmaster caused injury hanging flag at
scouting event); Baxter v. Morningside, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 893, 521 P.2d 946 (1974)
(volunteer driver for charitable organization caused injury); Manor v. Hanson, 120
Wis. 2d 582, 356 N.W.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1984) (volunteer driver for senior citizen
transportation program caused accident); see also Annot., 82 A.L.R.3D 1213, 1219-23
(1978) (collecting cases).
So See cases cited supra note 29.
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
82 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 501-02 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957); see also Note, Vicari-
ous Liability-A Limited Application of Respondeat Superior to Political Campaign-
ing, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 856, 871-72 (1979) (arguing for some application of
respondeat superior to cases of volunteer campaign workers).
10 Wash. App. 893, 521 P.2d 946 (1974).
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in question was caused by a car accident that occurred while the volun-
teer was on an errand. 5 The injured party sued both the volunteer, for
his negligence, and the charity, under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. The trial court dismissed the charity as a defendant, finding no
vicarious liability as a matter of law."6 On appeal, the court found that
it was indeed possible for the charitable organization to be liable under
respondeat superior doctrine.3 7 Since all of the requirements of the doc-
trine were satisfied, liability was imposed. 8
1. Negligence of the Servant
Before any questions of organizational liability can be addressed,
there first must be a finding that the servant was negligent. This ele-
ment of respondeat superior operates independently of any examination
of the relation between the volunteer and the organization and thus
does not implicate the more complex problems of adapting the doctrine
to cases of volunteers. 9 In Baxter, for example, the trial court made a
finding of fact that the volunteer driver negligently caused the accident,
and the appellate court did not disturb this finding.4
At times, however, it may be difficult to define negligence in the
case of a volunteer. Negligence is generally considered a departure from
the required standard of care."' This standard is grounded in the notion
of expectations; one is expected to act as a reasonable person would act
under the same circumstances.42 People may, however, have lower ex-
pectations of volunteers than of salaried workers, especially when vol-
35 See id. at 895, 521 P.2d at 947-48.
31 See id. at 894, 521 P.2d at 947.
37 See id. at 899, 521 P.2d at 949-50.
38 See id. at 899, 521 P.2d at 950.
3' Negligence by volunteers may, however, provide unique problems of proof of
injury and damages. Many volunteers work in situations in which intangible, and thus
difficult to prove, injuries are likely to occur. The cases to date applying the doctrine of
respondeat superior to the torts of volunteers have involved substantial physical injuries
or death. See cases cited supra note 29. These cases presented no new problems of
proving injury or causation; the pivotal issue was whether the organization could be
liable for the torts of a volunteer. However, tort cases alleging other, less tangible inju-
ries are now being successfully litigated. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27
Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (recognizing cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521
(1980) (same). The work of many volunteers revolves around interpersonal relation-
ships, providing support for others in times of trouble or vulnerability and other situa-
tions in which emotional injuries may be caused by negligent volunteers. The absence
of suits involving intangible injuries may reflect the difficult problems of proof in such
suits or perhaps the novelty of the legal remedy.
40 See 10 Wash. App. at 899, 521 P.2d at 949-50.
41 See PRossER, supra note 32, at 164.
42 See id. at 173-93.
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unteers are filling roles also held by salaried workers. If volunteers are
perceived to be less skilled than salaried workers, this perception may
produce lower expectations of ability, and the courts may require a
lower standard of care for volunteers.
2. Master-Servant Relationship
For those courts that have dealt with respondeat superior doctrine
in cases of alleged injuries by volunteers, finding a master-servant rela-
tionship has been the most troublesome part of the analysis. Before a
relationship will be designated as master-servant, the common law
mandates that three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the master must
have the right to control the physical conduct of the servant; (2) the
master must consent to the receipt of the service; and (3) the master
must expect to receive some benefit from the service.43
The right-to-control requirement raises difficult questions in cases
involving volunteers. It is not immediately obvious that organizations
have as much right to control their volunteers as employers have to
control their salaried employees. Nevertheless, most cases have con-
cluded that the right to control exists in a volunteer-organization rela-
tionship.4' The common law does not require the actual exercise of this
right but merely its presence.45 The payment of a salary is not neces-
sary to establish the right to control,' 6 and even though volunteers can
4S See Note, supra note 33, at 870-72; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 2 (1957) (defining master and servant); id. § 221 (requiring consent).
" See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); Baxter v. Morningside, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 893, 521 P.2d 946 (1974). But see
Davis v. Shelton, 33 A.D.2d 707, 304 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1969) (right of control did not
exist between boy scout council and volunteer scoutmaster), appeal dismissed, 26
N.Y.2d 829, 257 N.E.2d 902, 309 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1970).
41 See, e.g., Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983); Cole-
man v. Board of Educ., 477 Pa. 414, 421-22, 383 A.2d 1275, 1279 (1978).
4' The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that "[o]ne who volunteers services
without an agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of the one ac-
cepting such services." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 (1957). This state-
ment has been relied on extensively by courts in finding a master-servant relationship
when there is no salary or other payment to the servant. See, e.g., Duffy v. Harden,
179 N.W.2d 496, 503 (Iowa 1970); Mansfield v. Smithie, 615 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); Jones v. Herr, 39 Or. App. 937, 941, 594 P.2d 410, 412 (1979). But
cf. Crum v. Walker, 241 Iowa 1173, 1178, 44 N.W.2d 701, 704 (1950) (Even though
there does not have to be payment of wages, there must be some "lawful consideration
for the contract of employment" to establish the master-servant relationship.).
The cases and the examples given in the comments to section 225 of the Restate-
ment, however, do not involve volunteers as the term is being used in this Comment.
Rather, the comments and illustrations focus on gratuitous servants who do a favor for
an individual, often someone they know, receive no compensation, and serve for only
one particular occasion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 comments a,
b, illustrations 1, 3 (1957).
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be fired,47 the possibility of termination is not, as with salaried employ-
ees, the primary evidence of the right to control. 48 Rather, courts have
looked to the presence of specific instructions given to volunteers and
the nature of the agreement between the volunteer and the organization
to determine whether the requirement of control is satisfied.49 For ex-
ample, in Baxter the court noted that the volunteer and organization
specifically agreed on the purpose, destination, and details of the volun-
teer's task.50 Direct supervision of the volunteer was not necessary to
establish the right to control.51
Courts will at times consider how an organization represents its
relationship with a volunteer to the public in determining the existence
of the right to control. 52 The conduct of the volunteer and the organiza-
tion after the tort in question has taken place may also evidence control.
For example, in Garcia v. Herald Tribune Fresh Air Fund,5 3 an or-
ganization told its volunteer that it would handle all legal matters re-
41 See Park, The Fourth R: A Case for Releasing Volunteers, J. VOLUNTEER
AD., Spring 1984, at 1, 7; Should Volunteers Be Fired? Several Considerations, VOL-
UNTARY ACTION LEADERSHiP, Fall 1979, at 27, 29.
41 In the case of salaried employees, courts generally assume that the employer's
power to fire the worker operates to establish the right to control, even if no such threat
is actually made. See Note, supra note 33, at 871.
49 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099, 1102-03 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983) (when an organization directs the way in which a volunteer performs a
task, even if the volunteer does not assent, the right to control may be established by the
volunteer actually following the proferred instructions); Manor v. Hanson, 120 Wis. 2d
582, 585-86, 356 N.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Ct. App. 1984) (explicit written agreement of
the volunteer to abide by the organization's instructions in performing the task estab-
lished the right to control). Direct supervision of the volunteer is not necessary to estab-
lish the right to control. Cf Manor, 120 Wis. 2d at 585, 356 N.W.2d at 926 (organiza-
tion found to be master of volunteer driver even though it had never met with the
driver after the initial orientation and had no control over the volunteer's schedule).
50 See 10 Wash. App. at 898, 521 P.2d at 949.
5 See id.
52 See, e.g., Leno v. YMCA, 17 Cal. App. 3d 651, 658, 95 Cal. Rptr. 96, 100
(1971). The issue of how an organization presents to the public its relation to its volun-
teers was also emphasized by the Supreme Court in American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). Although this case involved an anti-
trust action against a professional society composed of volunteer members (and thus
falls outside the scope of this Comment), it is worth noting because it is the only time
that the Supreme Court has held that an organization may be liable for acts committed
by its volunteers. In holding the organization liable under the antitrust laws for the acts
of these volunteers, the Court relied primarily on the doctrine of apparent authority.
See id. at 566. Significant to the analysis in this Comment is the Court's note that the
association was in the best position to prevent these volunteers from violating the law.
See id. at 576.
For further commentary on Hydrolevel, see Curran, Volunteers . . . Not
Profiteers: The Hydrolevel Myth, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 147 (1983); Case Comment,
Nonprofit Associations are Subject to Antitrust Liability for the Acts of Their Agents
with Apparent Authority, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1487 (1983).
53 51 A.D.2d 897, 380 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1976).
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garding her accident. The court considered this conduct evidence of the
master-servant relationship."
The requirement of consent poses few difficulties in applying re-
spondeat superior to organization-volunteer relationships. As with the
right to control, the consent of the master need not be explicit in order
for the relationship to be found to exist.55 In Baxter the organization
specifically requested that the volunteer perform the errand, and thus
consent was evident.5 Often, notations about the volunteer in an organ-
ization's records or the formalized nature of the volunteer program in-
dicate implicit consent.5"
Finally, the requirement that the master behefit from the volun-
teer's work is easily satisfied.5" The court in Baxter determined that the
volunteer was benefiting the organization by doing the errand. 9 By
fulfilling a need of the organization, the volunteer's work benefits the
organization.
The common law, with its immunity for charitable organizations,
most likely did not envision the application of the doctrine of respon-
deat superior to cases involving volunteers. Nevertheless, all three ele-
ments of the master-servant relationship are generally found to exist in
cases of volunteers working for organizations.
3. Scope of Employment
Once it is established that the volunteer has caused an injury and
that the volunteer was a servant of the organization, liability will be
imposed on the organization only if it is determined that the volunteer
was acting within the scope of her "employment" at the time of
the injury.6" The tests for scope of employment are varied and
See id. at 897-98, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
See, e.g., Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz. App. 571, 574, 499
P.2d 185, 188 (1972) ("[There is no dispute that the Scottsdale Jaycees consented to
[the alleged injurer] acting as a volunteer .. .and hence he can be considered a ser-
vant or agent in the realm of respondeat superior .... ).
11 See 10 Wash. App. at 897-98, 521 P.2d at 949; see also Burns v. Sams, 458 So.
2d 359, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("A person who voluntarily assists in the work
of another with his consent may become a servant of the latter and that consent need
not be expressed, but may be implied."); cf Galvan v. Peters, 22 Wis. 2d 598, 126
N.W.2d 590 (1964) (since the ride was not arranged by a church official, a person
involved in an automobile accident while voluntarily driving church members home
from church held not a servant of the church).
5 See Baxter at 897-98, 521 P.2d at 949.
5 See, e.g., Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz. App. 571, 499 P.2d
185 (1972).
5 See 10 Wash. App. at 896, 521 P.2d at 949.
80 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957) (explaining when
master is liable for torts of servant).
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complex.61 One commentator, summarizing the tests, states that the em-
phasis is on how others perceive the relation: "[T]he person employed
is a servant when, in the eyes of the community, he would be regarded
as a part of the employer's own working staff, and not otherwise." 2 In
cases involving volunteers, courts' inquiries follow lines similar to those
followed in cases involving salaried workers. In Baxter the court noted
that the service performed was precisely that directed by the organiza-
tion and thus was within the scope of employment.6"
III. RmESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN
CONFLICT
A. The Effect of Tort Liability on Organizations
The message of the application of respondeat superior doctrine to
the torts of volunteers is that organizations must find ways of properly
controlling the behavior of volunteers in order to reduce the chances of
tort liability.64 The courts have almost always found the requisite right
to control, yet, in fact, most organizations have less control over volun-
teers than they have over salaried employees.
Volunteers present different challenges to an organization attempt-
ing to exercise control than do salaried employees. Even though volun-
"I See Note, supra note 33, at 872-76; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
228 (1957) (general statement on scope of employment).
62 See PROSSER, supra note 32, at 501.
63 10 Wash. App. at 896-98, 521 P.2d at 948-49. Compare Scottsdale Jaycees v.
Superior Court, 17 Ariz. App. 571, 499 P.2d 185 (1972) (holding that volunteer was
not acting within the scope of his employment while he was traveling to an organiza-
tion meeting as a designated delegate) with Vind v. Asamblea Apostolica de la Fe en
Christo Jesus, 148 Cal. App. 2d 597, 307 P.2d 85 (1957) (facts similar to Scottsdale,
but volunteer found to be within scope of employment).
" One possible effect of applying the doctrine of respondeat superior is that the
organization will deliberately structure the volunteer-organization relationship loosely
so that the necessary nexus of control will be found lacking. The organization can thus
disavow responsibility for volunteers' torts and be free from liability while benefiting
from the volunteers' services. For example, one commentator found that the relation-
ship between New York City and the Guardian Angels (youth volunteers who patrol
subways to promote safety and prevent crime) achieved this end. The agreement be-
tween them gave the city no say in selecting members or in scheduling the volunteers.
Although the agreement did provide for the city to receive regular information on the
volunteers' activities, the author nonetheless concluded that the control needed to estab-
lish a master-servant relationship was absent. See Comment, Municipal Liability for
Torts Committed by Volunteer Anticrime Groups, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 595, 627-
28 (1982).
Nevertheless, in most situations it is disadvantageous for an organization to create
an appearance of no control over the volunteer since courts almost always find that the
necessary control exists anyway. As stated above, the courts look to the right to control,
not the actual control exercised. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
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teers have a substantial stake in their positions, 5 the threat of termina-
tion is obviously less powerful for volunteers than than it is for salaried
workers. Thus, in the case of volunteers, organizations lack one of the
most important means of assuring compliance with organizational
policies.
Furthermore, the way an organization perceives its volunteers will
affect its willingness to exercise control. Many organizations have low
expectations of performance for their volunteers, fearing that if they try
to impose higher standards or exercise significant control, they will dis-
courage potential volunteers.6" This phenomenon may be called the
"gratitude factor": when an organization hires an employee, the organ-
ization realizes that the employee receives financial gain from the rela-
tionship, and it therefore feels justified in demanding a certain level of
performance from the employee. When an organization gains assistance
from a volunteer, however, the organization may be so grateful for any
help that it is reluctant to make demands on the volunteer."7
Organizations also find volunteers difficult to control because of
the types of tasks volunteers perform and the way that volunteer work
is scheduled. Most volunteers serve only part-time" and may not work
on a regular schedule. In addition, much volunteer work is performed
"in the field," outside of the organization's office.69 This large amount
of offsite work means the contact between volunteer and supervisor is
often less frequent and regular than that between salaried employee
and supervisor. It is therefore more difficult for the organization to
monitor and influence the behavior of a volunteer. 0
11 Many people volunteer to learn skills or to gain experience useful in the sala-
ried workforce, as well as to satisfy feelings of altruism. See, e.g., Love, Getting as
Much as You Give, SELF, Feb. 1982, at 14 (discussing the achievement of "professional
points" as well as "personal satisfaction" from volunteering); C. Truesdell, Transfera-
bility of Volunteer Skills: How and Why (1980) (commentary distributed by Adelphi
University's Center on Volunteerism) (discussing the fact that volunteers are increas-
ingly asking their employers to recognize the skills gained from volunteer work); see
also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
"' One writer, criticizing this common attitude, says that "it is widely as-
sumed . . . that, if a prospective volunteer shows up on an organization's doorstep,
'hiring' is a foregone conclusion." Park, supra note 47, at 3. The same writer discusses
the importance of demanding accountability from both volunteers and salaried staff, but
notes the reluctance of many groups to impose this on volunteers. See id. at 3-4.
67 A variation of this phenomenon is the attitude of some organizations that volun-
teers' motives are suspect and that volunteers are somehow foolish for working without
pay. When an organization doubts the motives and abilities of a volunteer, this becomes
a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the volunteer tends not to perform at high levels.
" The 1983 Gallup Poll showed that 57% of working people also volunteer. The
1983 Gallup Survey on Volunteering, reprinted in Allen, supra note 10, at 21.
69 Familiar examples include volunteer "friendly visitors," "big brothers" and
"big sisters," and scouting troop leaders.
7' This is not to say that organizations do not keep track of volunteers' work.
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The combined effect of the reduced impact of the threat of termi-
nation, the gratitude factor, and volunteers' time schedules and offsite
work makes it difficult for organizations to supervise volunteers. The
growing sophistication in volunteer management, however, has enabled
many organizations to surmount these difficulties and develop success-
ful ways to oversee volunteers. These organizations recognize that time
and effort devoted to training and supervising volunteers produce
higher levels of volunteer performance. 1 When organizations expect a
certain level of performance from volunteers and establish standards of
accountability, the attitude of the volunteers is affected. Rather than
viewing the quality of their work as unimportant, volunteers feel re-
sponsible for their activities and take pride in their work. The result of
this effort by management is that volunteers are more careful and thus
less likely to perform negligently. Volunteers, as this latter group of
organizations proves, are not inherently impossible to control, but a de-
gree of imagination and energy is required to develop such control.
Since organizations assign volunteers to tasks in which the volun-
teers could injure third parties, it is reasonable to expect organizations
to oversee the activities of their volunteers. If organizations are liable
for injuries caused by volunteers, there is a strong economic incentive to
take precautions in selecting and supervising them.7 ' Thus, imposing
liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior appropriately en-
courages organizations to develop control over their volunteers.78 The
Many volunteer programs keep careful records of the hours volunteers work and the
tasks they perform. See generally S. ELLIs & K. NoYEs, PROOF PosrrrvE: DEVELOP-
ING SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTEER RECORDKEEPING SYSTEMS (1980) (Volunteer Energy
Series) (suggesting ways to design and maintain records for volunteer programs).
71 For example, the evaluation of volunteers' performance is an integral part of
many volunteer programs and is recommended by experts in volunteer management.
See, e.g., K. BROWN, KEYS TO MAKING A VOLUNTEER PROGRAM WORK 67-78
(1982).
72 See PRossER, supra note 32, at 501.
73 There are some situations in which the master cannot, despite the economic
incentives, monitor and influence the servant's actions to reduce risk. For example,
suppose that a volunteer working for a church visits sick people in their homes and
brings them food packages. The church tells her which people have expressed a desire
to have such visitors, and the church provides her with the packages. However, she
schedules the visits herself and uses her own discretion to govern her conduct while in
the clients' homes. A volunteer performing this type of service was held to be a servant
of the church in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). The church was held liable for an automobile accident caused by the volunteer.
See id. at 1101.
Suppose the volunteer, while visiting someone's home, negligently knocks over a
valuable vase and breaks it. Should the church be held liable? Clearly, the volunteer
was acting within the scope of her employment, and the principle of respondeat supe-
rior will be applied. Yet there was nothing the church could have done to prevent such
damage. The application of respondeat superior here fails to serve its function of en-
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current insurance situation, however, precludes the effective use of this
doctrine and may operate to discourage volunteerism.
B. The Insurance Industry and Organizations with Volunteers
In the eyes of commercial insurance underwriters, the presence of
volunteers within an organization raises a "red flag."'74 Insurance com-
panies are reluctant to cover volunteers, believing that the organization
does not control the volunteers, that volunteers are not effectively
screened or trained, that volunteers may not be motivated to succeed in
their assignments, and that volunteers are inadequately supervised. 5 As
a result of these perceptions, volunteers are either excluded from many
liability policies or are assigned to high-risk rate categories, and the
organizations are charged correspondingly high premiums. 6
This pattern in the insurance industry is at odds with the realities
of volunteerism. The automatic assignment of organizations that utilize
volunteers to high-risk categories ignores the fact that such organiza-
tions exercise different amounts of control over their volunteers. Insur-
ers unrealistically consider the vast volunteer workforce to be homoge-
neous and assume that most organizations are inept in their
management of volunteers.
This reaction of insurers stems largely from a lack of knowledge
about volunteers and the nonprofit world. Although nonprofit organiza-
tions are often excellent insurance risks, 77 insurers erroneously believe
that these organizations are not profitable to insure.7 The presence of
volunteers merely accentuates the impression of uncertainty and risk in
couraging precautions. See Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under
the Law of Agency, 91 YAE L.J. 168, 169, 190-91 (1981). In most cases, however, the
organization can prevent damage by training its volunteers better. The benefits of im-
posing the respondeat superior doctrine to encourage such training in the majority of
cases outweigh the doctrine's ineffectiveness in the rare case when an organization
could not have prevented the harm.
74 See Chapman, Volunteer Insurance, VOLUNTARY ACTION LEADERSHIP, Win-
ter 1980, at 23.
1 See Lynes, Yes-Insurance is Necessary, J. VOLUNTARY AD., Spring 1979, at
15.
718 See T. CHAPMAN, M. LAI & E. STEINBOCK, AM I COVERED FOR . . . ?-A
GUIDE TO INSURANCE FOR NON-PROFITS 115-16 (1984); Chapman, supra note 74, at
23; see also Lynes, supra note 75, at 15.
17Telephone interview with Rodney Harvey, Underwriting Manager, First Non
Profit Pooling Trust (Feb. 11, 1985).
78 One organization that insures only nonprofit organizations reports a pure-loss
ratio (incurred losses/premiums earned) of 63% over a five year period; the average
pure-loss ratio for the insurance industry is between 75% and 80%. Telephone inter-
view with Rodney Harvey, Underwriting Manager, First Non Profit Pooling Trust
(May 30, 1985).
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the minds of insurers .7  Without proper knowledge about volunteer
programs, underwriters lack the proper criteria with which to evaluate
the risks involved.
Although organizations that utilize volunteers react in various
ways to the insurance situation, one can conclude safely that extremely
expensive insurance tends to discourage an expansion of volunteers'
roles. Many organizations limit the responsibilities of their volunteers
to keep premiums down.80 Restrictions on volunteer activity conform to
insurers' perceptions about what volunteers can do, but do not accu-
rately reflect volunteers' capabilities.
The difficulty in obtaining affordable insurance also serves to un-
dermine the incentive to carefully supervise and train volunteers created
by the imposition of respondeat superior. Even if an organization insti-
tutes changes in its management of volunteers in response to the influ-
ences of the tort system, that organization may not realize the immedi-
ate reward of lower insurance rates. Flexible insurance rates that vary
depending on the ability of an organization to control volunteers would
provide an incentive to improve that control. The current rigidity in
rate assignments counters the effect of respondeat superior in encourag-
ing control.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE INSURANCE PROBLEM
The difficulty of obtaining affordable insurance to cover volun-
teers' torts has not gone unnoticed. One commentator has suggested
three alternatives to address this problem: immunity for volunteers, risk
pooling, and increased advocacy." Since none of these proposals meets
the immediate needs of most organizations, however, this Comment
proposes a fourth alternative, an insurance regulation."
The first suggested alternative is legislative exemption of volun-
teers and nonprofit organizations from tort liability.8 Although at least
one state is now considering such legislation, 4 such laws are unlikely to
' See id.
80 See Letter from Diane Pasta, Supervisor of Volunteers for Senior Rights Assis-
tance, to Linda Crerar, State Center for Voluntary Action (Mar. 28, 1983) (noting that
her organization structures volunteer roles so as to keep insurance premiums afforda-
ble) [on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
81 See Lynes, supra note 75, at 16.
82 See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
83 See Lynes, supra note 75, at 16.
The Attorney General of Arkansas is preparing to introduce a statute to the
state legislature that would "protect volunteers, volunteer organizations, and clients
from liability. Under this law, volunteers would be required to have job descriptions,
appropriate training and be registered as a volunteer with the organization (record
keeping would be necessary)." Letter from Maralynn Troutmann, Program Developer,
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be widely adopted given the growing trend toward abolishing charitable
immunity.8 5 In addition, immunity laws, unlike the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, provide no incentive for organizations to better supervise
volunteers.
The second proposal suggests that, because insurance companies
do not recognize the true diversity in volunteer management, organiza-
tions should form large groups, pool their resources, and become self-
insurers.8" Pursuant to legislation in Illinois,87 one such "pool" has
been formed.88 Nonprofit, federally tax-exempt organizations pay pre-
miums into a common fund from which claims are paid out. 9 This
pooling enables nonprofit organizations to circumvent the problems of
obtaining commercial insurance. Because the pool's underwriters are
familiar with nonprofit organizations and their reliance on volunteers,
they can realistically assess the risk for potential insureds and provide
the organizations with appropriate underwriting.
Insurance rates that vary with the actual degree of risk encourage
organizations to minimize their risk by improving volunteer manage-
ment, thus reinforcing the goals of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Despite these advantages, however, there are significant barriers to the
formation of insurance pools. Enabling legislation must be passed prior
to their formation, and, to date, Illinois is the only state that has such
laws. 1 Efforts to enact similar legislation in other states have failed. 2
In addition, even if proper legislation were passed, it would be some
time before the pools could be sufficiently organized to encompass all of
the organizations that currently utilize volunteers. In the meantime, the
expansion of volunteerism may be hampered by the lack of available
insurance. Risk pooling remains an important and promising alterna-
tive, but a more immediate solution is needed.
The third suggested alternative involves advocacy by nonprofit or-
ganizations on a nationwide scale to "impact insurance companies and
Arkansas Office of Volunteerism, to Jeffrey Kahn (Jan. 11, 1985) [on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
85 See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
86 See Lynes, supra note 75, at 16.
87 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 201-227 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
" See Georgandas, Insurance Coverage for Nonprofits, NONPROFrr WORLD
REP., July-Aug. 1983, at 28.
89 See id. Recent data shows that some 714 nonprofit organizations are benefi-
ciaries, and annual contributions earned are in excess of $2.3 million. See FnRsT
TRUST: A NON PROFIT RISK POOUNG ENTrrY, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT (1985).
90 See telephone interview with Rodney Harvey, supra note 77.
91 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 201-227 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
92 Attempts were made in California and Indiana. See telephone interview with
Rodney Harvey, supra note 77.
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to negotiate rates."93 This proposal also fails to meet the current needs
of organizations. One group that has attempted such advocacy reported
that "the insurance industry as a whole revealed its unwillingness to
engage in extended sessions of consistent, change-oriented dialogue." 4
This group concluded that, "if major policy changes were to occur, they
would do so without immediate and willing participation of the [insur-
ance] industry." '95 This experience suggests that advocacy will be inef-
fective in changing the insurance industry's policy in this area.
If insurers will not voluntarily recognize the differences among
volunteer programs and the possibility of reducing risks through close
supervision, a statutory requirement to do so may be necessary. With-
out such a requirement, the efficacy of the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior to encourage better volunteer management is diluted, and volunteer
participation may be discouraged. This Comment proposes a general
statutory scheme96 that entitles organizations to preferential insurance
treatment if they meet certain requirements in their volunteer manage-
ment methods. The proposal recognizes that insurers lack the knowl-
edge to differentiate properly among volunteer programs and forces in-
surers to make distinctions based on some rational and dependable
criteria.
In order to qualify for favorable insurance treatment, organiza-
tions would be required to satisfy certain verifiable criteria.9 7 The core
requirement of this Comment's proposal is the creation of a written job
description for every volunteer in an organization's program. A written
job description is a vital tool in the management of volunteers." Indeed,
many established programs already utilize written job descriptions for
every volunteer. 99
93 See Lynes, supra note 75, at 16.
" Telephone interview with R. Eugene Lokey, Director of Governmental Rela-
tions for the Consortium for Human Services (Aug. 27, 1985).
95 Id.
" Note that the goal of this portion of the Comment is not to draft a particular
statute but rather to provide general guidelines.
"These requirements are similar to those envisioned by the Arkansas Attorney
General's Office. See supra note 84.
"s See M. WILSON, THE EFFECTIvE MANAGEMENT OF VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS
101-20 (1976); Cauley, Job Descriptions: Matching Volunteer Skills with Agency
Needs, SYNERGIST, Winter 1974, at 36; Ellis & Noyes, Citizens Inside: Supporting
Teamwork, CORRECTIONS TODAY, June 1983, at 48.
See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOC. OF ZOOLOGICAL PARKS & AQUARIUMS, VOLUN-
TEERS IN ZOOS AND AQUARIUMS, at 111-6 (1981); DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS., STATE
OF UTAH, JOB DESCRIPTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS IN UTAH HUMAN SERVICES (1983);
NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, VOLUNTEERS IN THE PARKS 29
(1982); UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY ASS'NS, INC., UCP's "HEART AND ENERGY": A
VOLUNTEER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY AFFILIATES 13
(1981); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, THE MINISTRY OF VOLUNTEERS: A GUIDE-
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Under this proposal, the job description must be fairly detailed
and should include the volunteer's name and title, the program for
which the volunteer works, a designated supervisor for the volunteer, a
list of the volunteer's -duties, a description of training and orientation
received by the volunteer, 00 and specification of the time commitment
expected from the volunteer. In addition, the organization must keep
records of when each volunteer works.'O Each volunteer must sign and
date her job description form on the first day she works, verifying the
existence and accuracy of the description. The document would thus
predate any tort of the volunteer for which the organization might be
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
A detailed job description facilitates better volunteer management
and thus minimizes risks. The exercise of writing out the volunteer's
duties in order to receive preferential insurance rates encourages orga-
nizations to pinpoint the skills needed for each job and to recruit volun-
teers who have those skills.10 2 More qualified volunteers are less likely
to cause injuries. The job description also forces the organization to
anticipate which tasks are potentially dangerous, alerting the organiza-
tion to the need for proper volunteer training and supervision for those
tasks,103 and helping alert the volunteer of possible risks of personal
liability. Additionally, the job description will serve as a yardstick for
evaluating (and thus improving) volunteers' performances.'" Finally,
the mandatory assignment of a specific supervisor designates responsi-
bility to control the volunteer.
In order to make certain that insurers adjust their rates for organi-
zations that comply with the statutory requirements, the enacting state
could also establish a monitoring commission, composed of representa-
tives from the nonprofit sector, the insurance industry, and the state.
This commission would have the responsibility of ensuring that insur-
ers are not discriminating unfairly against organizations utilizing vol-
unteers and are appropriately distinguishing between qualifying and
nonqualifying organizations. The commission could also make recom-
BOOK FOR CHURCHES 12 (1979).
100 "Training" is the teaching of specific skills needed to perform the job; "orien-
tation" is the presentation of a general overview of the organization's purpose, facilities,
staff, etc. See E. SCHINDLER-RAINMAN & R. LiPPrrT, supra note 15, at 64-81.
101 See Ellis & Noyes, supra note 98, at 64.
102 See Cauley, The Valuable, Vital Volunteer Job Description, VOLUNTARY Ac-
TION LEADERSHIP, Spring 1978, at 26.
103 See, e.g., AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL AD-
MINISTRATION HANDBOOK § IV, at 2 (1984) (In order to minimize losses "it is essen-
tial that volunteers receive training, guidance, and direction as to how to do their duties
without incurring liability.").
104 See Cauley, supra note 98, at 26.
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mendations to the legislature concerning the substance of the qualifica-
tions an organization must meet in order to obtain preferential
treatment.
From the perspective of organizations, this proposal would give
direction on how to structure volunteer management. Public promotion
of the proven technique of written job descriptions, combined with the
strong insurance incentive, would encourage organizations to use job
descriptions. Organizations would find administering volunteer pro-
grams easier and, armed with both management tools and flexible in-
surance treatment, would be able to expand the roles of volunteers.
From the viewpoint of volunteers, the proposal would encourage
the expansion of their roles. Furthermore, the job description would
serve to clarify the goals of the job. A management system based on
written job descriptions could aid volunteers in accomplishing their
goals. Supervision, training, and evaluation of volunteer performance,
all furthered by written job descriptions, are signs that the organization
respects the volunteer, not that the organization distrusts the volunteer.
By spending time and energy helping volunteers to function effectively,
the organization would confer the most effective type of recognition
possible.10 5
One possible objection to the increased supervision and control of
volunteers is that it may undermine the value of volunteering by intro-
ducing an element of hierarchy into volunteer programs. The imposi-
tion of some structure is, however, necessary if groups are to function
efficiently.106 Since individuals donate their time as volunteers specifi-
cally to accomplish tasks, a degree of structure and supervision would
add to their experience, not detract from it.
From a legal perspective, the proposal would aid courts in apply-
ing the doctrine of respondeat superior in torts involving volunteers. By
establishing the right to control and by defining the scope of employ-
ment, the proposal would facilitate judicial adoption of the traditionally
employee-oriented doctrine.
Finally, from a social perspective, this proposal would encourage
an expansion of volunteerism by facilitating the availability of afforda-
ble insurance. Moreover, the proposal would aid in reducing the inci-
dence of negligence among volunteers by providing a strong incentive to
develop management systems that encourage effective and safe volun-
105 See Friedlieb, Volunteer Recognition Is:, ADELPHI UNIVERSrrY's CENTER ON
VOLUNTEERISM COMMENTARY, Oct. 1979, at 1.
106 Cf. Joreen, The Tyranny of Structurelessness, in RADICAL FEINIsM 296-97
(A. Koedt, E. Levine & A. Rapone eds. 1972) (discussing the impact of "structureless-
ness" on the women's liberation movement).
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teering. In meeting the inevitable opposition of the insurance lobby,
legislators should realize that this system is not necessarily contrary to
the interests of the insurance industry. Unlike risk-pooling legislation,
this proposal does not create a separate insurance entity to compete
with commercial insurance companies. Rather, it helps companies prof-
itably insure volunteer programs by accurately assessing the risks. The
adoption of the proposal would encourage organizations to buy proper
insurance in the established market.
CONCLUSION
Nonprofit organizations, at one time immune from any liability,
are now held liable for the torts of their workers, including volunteers,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Because imposing liability
encourages better supervision of volunteers and thus more effective vol-
unteer work, this Comment supports the use of the doctrine of respon-
deat superior and attempts to dispel any fears that this legal standard
will work against volunteerism.
The insurance industry, however, is undermining the beneficial ef-
fects of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The insurance problem is
grounded in the insurance industry's fears and lack of knowledge about
volunteers. The insurers' categorization of most volunteer programs as
high-risk, together with the failure to distinguish programs that have
developed proper volunteer management, eliminates any incentive for
organizations to strengthen control over volunteers. Furthermore, the
difficulty of obtaining affordable insurance discourages the use of
volunteers.
The proposed statutory scheme seeks to remedy the insurance
problem by supporting preferential insurance treatment for those
organizations that have significant control over their volunteers and by
suggesting rational guidelines to use in determining which organiza-
tions in fact exercise 'this control. In addition to estimating insurance
risks more accurately, these guidelines could be used by organizations
to improve the quality of volunteer work. Furthermore, the availability
of insurance would encourage organizations to expand the volunteer's
role. Although this proposal may be criticized for giving preferential
treatment to volunteer programs, the tremendous value of volunteerism
to our society warrants special treatment to ensure the continued safe
delivery of volunteer services.
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